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The 24 October 1992, Bangor Daily News ran a story respecting the Charlottetown 
Accord wherein three Aboriginal Canadians held differing views concerning the 
Accord. One Mic Mac favoured the Accord, opining that for the first time 
Aboriginal Canadians would be given a chance to govern themselves and receive 
“recognition.” One gentleman felt that the Accord should be rejected, believing 
that the Federal Government was abdicating its appropriate role vis-à-vis Native 
Canadians. He further opined that the Provinces really did not care about Native 
Canadians anyway and the threat of oppression from the Provinces seemed more 
dangerous than did the threat from the national government. A third Native 
Canadian felt the Indians should take no part whatsoever in the Referendum, 
arguing that, as sovereign nations, they should not involve themselves in the affairs 
of others.1 It would seem that all of these points of view have merit, depending 
upon how the First Canadians view themselves, where they wish to go, and what 
they wish to be.
In the United States, Native American-Federal Government relationships have 
a long and rich tradition, at least in the ideal, as set forth in scores of Federal 
Court cases, including United States Supreme Court decisions. Chief Justice John 
Marshall, in the famous Cherokee Indian cases2 set a number of ringing 
precedents respecting Indian tribal sovereignty. The many tribal courts which exist 
today owe much to the powerful language used by Marshall in those cases. Some 
of that language, from Worcester, is worth noting:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct 
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest 
of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their 
own laws. It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of 
either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the 
inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that discovery of 
either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, 
which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors.3
Later in that case Marshall observed:
Chief Judge, Penobscot Indian Nation, Old Town, Maine.
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The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political 
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors 
of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by 
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European 
potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: 
and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, 
as well as on the Indians. The very term “nation”, so generally applied to them, 
means “a people distinct from others”. The constitution, by declaring treaties 
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has 
adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and 
consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making 
treaties. The words “treaty” and “nation” are words of our own language, selected 
in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite 
and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have 
applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same 
sense.4
And finally:
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine 
of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence 
-  its rights to self-government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its 
protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under 
the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of 
government, and ceasing to be a state.5
The exact philosophical basis for Indian sovereignty has been the subject of 
judicial disagreement since the Supreme Court divided in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia.6 Chief Justice Marshall and Justice McLean viewed the Indian tribes as 
“Domestic Dependent Nations.” Justices Johnson and Baldwin saw the Indians 
as possessing no sovereignty at all. Justices Thompson and Story, relying upon 
renowned international law writers, Vittel, Victoria and Grotius, felt that weaker, 
non-European communities were sovereigns and that their sovereignty was not 
diminished by entering into treaties with militarily superior nations. The Marshall 
view still is the generally recognized basis of federal-tribal relationships; that is, the 
Indian tribes are considered domestic dependent nations in a guardian-ward sense.
The vast body of Indian law which emerged in the States involves federal-tribal 
relationships rather than state-tribal relations. These latter relationships are 
likewise mostly determined by application of federal law in federal courts. This 
is because the Indian Commerce Clause7 has been interpreted by the Supreme
4Supra, note 2 at 559.
5Ibid. at 560.
6Supra, note 2. The Supreme Court split: 2-2-2 (1 absent).
7United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Court as giving the U.S. Congress plenary power over Indian affairs. Federal 
courts have construed this power as one which pre-empts a similar exercise by the 
states. Generally, the powers exercised by the states, in the area of Indian affairs, 
are only powers and relationships permitted or condoned by Congress and the 
federal courts. Much of this Congressional power over Indians is exercised 
through the Bureau of Indian Affairs under the Department of the Interior.
What then, are the powers possessed by these domestically dependent Indian 
Nations? Felix Cohen, the recognized U.S. authority on Indian law, states:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is 
marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe 
possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest 
renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in 
substance, terminates the ©eternal powers of sovereignty of the tribe; e.g., its power 
to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal 
sovereignty of the tribe; i.e. its powers of local self-government. (3) These powers 
are subject to qualifications by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, 
save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in 
the Indian tribes and in their duty constituted organs of government.8
Cohen argues, and many federal court decisions have accepted the proposition, 
that the statutes of Congress must be examined to determine the limitations of 
tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or positive content. What 
is not expressly limited remains within the domain of tribed sovereignty.
Perhaps the most basic principal of all Indian law, supported by a host of 
decisions, is that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, 
in general, delegated powers, granted by express acts of Congress, but rather 
‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished’. The 
Supreme Court has held that ‘Indian tribes still possess those aspects of 
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary 
result of their dependent status’.9
The political history of tribal-federal relations has not always been a happy one 
for Native Americans. From 1790 to 1874, Congress employed policies of removal 
of the Indians from their lands and relocation of the Indians westward. Later from 
1871 to 1927, the Indian was placed in a reservation system and traditional Indian 
treaty lands were broken up by allotment of those lands to individual Indians, as 
distinguished from the tribe itself, in the hope that the assimilation of the Indian 
would result in the extermination of the Indian culture and government. Past 
policies were re-evaluated and Indian reorganization of the tribes was permitted
8R. Strickland et al., Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Charlottesville: Bobbs-Meril, 
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pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 193410 followed by the termination 
of Congress’ relationship and funding with the tribes. Once again the hope was 
that assimilation would result (1945-1961). Finally, in 1961, Congress proclaimed 
the self-determination era of Native American tribal governments and cultures.
The present policy reflects the increasing awareness by Congress, the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs and the federal courts, that aside from working a terrible 
injustice, “Removal,” “Relocation,” “Allotment,” “Assimilation”and “Termination” 
did not accomplish their intended effect. Indians, and their cultures, for better, 
persisted.
According to David Getches, editor of the casebook Federal Indian Law, there 
are 488 federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States, with approximately 
1.4 million Indians, comprising about half of one percent of the nation’s 
population, and owning approximately 52.5 million acres of land, or about 2.4% 
of all land in the United States.11 It seems now to have become popular and 
politically correct to encourage these people to govern themselves with their own 
institutions, including their own tribal courts.
For many years the federal government had provided the dominant law and 
order on Indian reservations through its Bureau of Indian Affairs’ police and 
federal investigative entities. In the “History of Tribal Courts,” Sockbeson, 
Managing Attorney of the Native American Rights Fund, implied that these early 
Indian courts, set up by the agencies of the federal government, were in actuality, 
effective in undermining the powers of the traditional chiefs and therefore, the 
tribes in general.12 Sockbeson states:
The new court system not only challenged traditional leadership but also redirected 
tribal notions of justice. The traditional remedies of compensation and mediation 
were abandoned and Indians were introduced to the more “enlightened” method 
of European justice. Jail time and fines were the remedies imposed.13
It cannot be denied that a significant minority of Native Americans are still 
distrustful of even their own tribal courts. While most tribal members see the 
advantages of having their own court system, this writer senses that some 
traditional members would far prefer to see that power, and all other tribal power,
10c. 576, 48 Stat. 944.
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vested in the traditional leadership of the tribe. Tribal courts are considered by 
some to be a white man’s institution antithetical to Indian tradition. When this 
writer was offered the position of Appellate Justice by the Passamaquoddy Nation, 
it caused a raise of the eyebrow when the Nation submitted a written contract 
containing the provision: The Judge shall be subject to the supervision and 
direction of the Tribe or designated representatives. Of course such a contract 
would clearly have violated the separation of powers doctrine and could not be 
signed. Happily, the written contract was shelved and the Passamaquoddys 
obtained their Appellant Judge on a handshake. But the point is clear, that the 
Indian may never completely trust the white man or his institutions. Unhappily, 
the long trail of broken treaties and agreements would warrant that mistrust. 
Hopefully a new day will come to dawn based on mutually kept promises.
One may well ask: Did the Europeans have a corner on the justice market? 
Were all the European institutional concepts, in fact, more just than those 
possessed by the Native Americans themselves? The case of Ex Parte Crow Dog, 
is illuminating.14 In Crow Dog, two Sioux Indian chiefs saw a political rivalry 
escalate until one chief, Crow Dog, shot and killed the other, one Spotted Tail. 
The Sioux tribal council, following tribal law and tradition, ordered peacemakers 
to meet with both families and an award was made to Spotted Tail’s survivors of 
$600 (a substantial sum in 1883), 8 horses and a blanket. Tribal harmony was 
restored. The Europeans would have given Crow Dog a speedy trial and a 
speedier hanging. But where would that have left the widow and the orphans?
In fact, that is precisely what did occur. Crow Dog was tried for murder by 
the District Court in the Territory of Dakota, convicted and sentenced to hang. 
The United States Supreme Court reserved however, holding that Crow Dog was 
not subject to federal prosecution for an act that he, an Indian, had committed 
against another Indian on the reservation. The Court placed great weight upon 
the protection of the Sioux’s right of self-government, which the Court found to 
have been a primary objective of the United States treaties with the tribe. The 
Court also appeared sensitive to the role of the Indians’ own value system in the 
exercise of that self government. Those sensitivities were not, however, apparently 
shared by Congress, which, outraged by the release of Crow Dog, immediately 
thereafter enacted the Major Crimes Act of 1885.15 This Act thereafter ceded to 
the United States power to try and to punish murder and a list of other 
enumerated serious crimes committed by Indians in Indian territory. The Major 
Crimes Act, still today, results in serious criminal offenses being tried in federal 
courts, in most states, with lesser offenses being tried in the various tribal courts.
14(1883), 109 U.S. 556.
1518 U.S.C.A. § 1153 [hereinafter the Major Crimes Act].
A few states have accepted the responsibility and jurisdiction for the prosecution 
of these crimes under state law.
The federal-tribal dichotomy does not, however, subsist in Maine, wherein 
federal jurisdiction over major crimes is now ceded to the State of Maine. That 
scenario came about as follows: Maine Indian tribes were laying claim to lands 
in all of Maine. They argued that their lands had been ceded away in violation of 
the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, which essentially declares void all 
land transactions with the Indians accomplished without the approval or consent 
of Congress.16 Few took the Indians’ claims to all of Maine very seriously. But 
when the case of Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton17 held 
that the right to extinguish Indian title to land was an attribute of sovereignty 
which no state (only the federal government) can exercise and that the Non­
intercourse Acts18 gave statutory recognition to that fact, Maine politicians and 
landowners began to get a queasy feeling in the pit of their stomachs. Clearly, a 
land claims agreement was now a necessity. The result was the federal enabling 
act, entitled the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 198019 and the Maine act, 
An Act to Implement the Maine Indian Claims Settlement.20 These Acts, in 
addition to solving the land claims dispute by establishing a Land Acquisition Fund 
and a Settlement Fund for the Maine tribes, also, and perhaps more importantly, 
completely revamped the federal tribal jurisdictional framework in Maine.
No longer would the federal government prosecute serious criminal offenses 
committed by Indians in Indian territory in Maine. In fact, the federal government 
almost totally withdrew its role in the area of criminal jurisdiction. (There are still 
some federal statutes, such as the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which permit 
habeas corpus relief in federal forums.)21 But the new statutory framework 
essentially provided that the State of Maine would thenceforth prosecute Class A 
through C crimes (more serious crimes), and the Maine Tribal Courts would 
prosecute Class D and E crimes. Although the issue has not been judicially 
decided, it is the opinion of this writer that the tribes nevertheless do possess 
concurrent jurisdiction over major crimes. It might be wondered how popular the
16c. 33,1 Stat. 137.
17(1975), 528 F. 2d 370.
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attempted exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction would be with tribal defendants, 
however.
The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act also provided for exclusive tribal 
juvenile jurisdiction and Indian child custody jurisdiction respecting on-reservation 
Indians. Congress gave broad protection to tribes and Indian parents in the Indian 
Child Welfare Act of 1978.22 The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act also clearly 
enumerated certain powers possessed by the tribes, for example the power to 
enact ordinances, collect taxes, decide tribal governmental organization, have tribal 
elections, dispose settlement income, designate officers and officials to administer 
the law, determine voting qualifications and so forth.
Since appeal from the Maine Tribal Courts is to the Tribal Appellate Division, 
and since there is no appeal thereafter to any state court, it becomes clear that the 
powers of the Tribal Courts are substantial. This is even more true with respect 
to tribal court civil jurisdiction. Felix Cohen, in the Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law states:
The judicial powers of Indian tribes outside the field of criminal jurisdiction are 
much less restricted. The Indian Civil Rights Act applies to tribal proceedings but 
is not subject to direct federal court review. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49 (1978). There is no limitation on tribal criminal punishments. Tribal 
authority over cases involving non-Indians is well established in some circumstances 
and may exist in many others. There are few statutes conferring Indian country 
jurisdiction on the federal courts in civil cases that raise questions of preemption 
of concurrent tribal court jurisdiction. Under the principal that tribal sovereignty 
is retained where not ceded to or restricted by federal authority, tribal court civil 
jurisdiction is very broad.23
In Williams v. Lee, the United States Supreme Court held that the State of 
Arizona, Superior Court, did not have jurisdiction to hear a civil suit brought by 
a non-Indian against an Indian, for a transaction that had occurred on the 
reservation.24 In holding that the non-Indian’s only forum was tribal court, the 
Supreme Court said:
[AJbsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the 
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them. Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption 
that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation.
To assure adequate government of Indian tribes it enacted comprehensive statutes 
in 1834 regulating trade with Indians and organizing a Department of Indian
^  U.S.CA. § 1901.
23Supra, note 8 at 341.
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Affairs. Not satisfied solely with centralized government of Indians, it encouraged 
tribal governments and courts to become stronger and more highly organized.25
How far then have Native American judicial systems come to approaching 
their European models? Kirke Kickingbirde, in Indian Jurisdiction, believes:
In recent years Indian Nations have demonstrated an important trend toward 
regaining confidence in their ability to administer law and order. New 
constitutions, by-laws, and law and order codes are being written. Some Indian 
Nations are making formal extradition agreements with surrounding local 
governments, while others have developed law enforcement agencies and tribal 
courts. Many Indian Nations have established judicial systems pursuant tribal 
constitutions and ordinances developed under the provisions of the Indian 
Reorganization Act. In 1980 there were approximately 150 tribal courts handling 
well over 80,000 cases. These courts include tribal courts, traditional (custom) 
courts, Courts of Indian Offenses (CFR), and conservation courts concerned with 
hunting and fishing. Tribal judges are either appointed or elected, depending on 
the specific tribal judicial system. Many non-Indians have attacked the capabilities 
of tribal courts and have used this criticism to justify state and federal jurisdiction 
in Indian Country. However, a recent study by the American Indian Policy Review 
Commission emphasizes the fact that tribal justice systems are evolving institutions, 
becoming more and more sophisticated, and are potentially capable of assuming 
total jurisdiction in Indian Country. The study concluded that tribal court systems 
are as capable as non-Indian judicial systems in administering justice in Indian 
Country.26
Having viewed the tribal court development from within, as both trial and 
appellate judge, I agree with Kickingbirde’s assessment of tribal court 
sophistication and capability.
Some of the differences between state and tribal courts may result in the tribal 
courts being more just and sensitive to the needs of criminal defendants, parties 
plaintiff and the Nations themselves. The carved totem poles on each side of the 
Judge’s bench, the wooden eagle, woven baskets, warclub and other traditional and 
customary artifacts, which enliven the Penobscot Nation Tribal Court, for example, 
are all intended to allow the participant to feel more at home and less alien. 
Courts, in general, after all, do tend to become places capable of imparting fear 
and intimidation. The defendant is being prosecuted for a crime, divorced, sued 
on a contract or some other such thing. Justice must be done but need it be done 
in precisely the same way and with the same cold aesthetic manner so often 
associated with the white man’s court? While it is true that the laws of the State 
of Maine are enforced in the tribal courts in Maine, it is also true that the laws 
and ordinances of the tribes are enforced, as are the customs and traditions of
^Ibid.
^K. Kickingbirde, A. Tallchief Skibine & L. Kickingbirde, Indian Jurisdiction (Washington: Institute 
for the Development of Indian Law, 1983) at 25.
these Native Americans. These people have always regarded restitution, 
rehabilitation and reintegration of the wayward tribal member back into tribal 
harmony, as superior to European concepts of retribution and punishment, such 
as hanging, firing squad, electric chair and jail time.
The attempts to harmonize the competing customs and traditions of the Indian 
and the non-Indian will continue to play out in tribal courts all across the land for 
years to come. It is submitted that the Indian has many very valuable things to 
bring to the American justice system. One may ask if the survivors of Spotted Tail 
were not better served by their own traditional notions of justice than that 
furnished to them by the European? If the non-Aboriginal Canadian should fear 
that these Aboriginal Peoples cannot competently govern themselves, perhaps the 
history of the development of tribal justice in the United States might alleviate that 
fear.
